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Coombs: Evidence: Declarations Against Interest in Montana
NOTE AND COMMENT
these cases don't support the holding in the Kirkup case, where
the services were being performed for the corporation itself
and had not been paid for in any other way.
It is hoped that if the Montana Supreme Court is ever
again called on to determine the validity of a contract for issue
of stock in return for services to be performed before the date
of issue, it will overrule Kirkup v. Anaconda Amusement Co.
and follow what seems to be the weight of authority-that such
a contract is valid."
-Arthur C. Mertz.

EVIDENCE:

DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST
IN MONTANA

Much confusion still exists regarding the distinction between a declaration against interest and an admission in the Law
of Evidence.' Under common law rules, it has long been settled
that as an exception to the hearsay rule, declarations of persons
"There is a further ground on which the holding of the Kirkup case
might be questioned: Even assuming that the contract involved is
one looking to the issuance of stock before the services are to be
performed, does it necessarily follow that the contract is utterly void?
The wording of the constitutional provision does not lead to such
a conclusion. Indeed, the fact that it refers to "all fictitious increase
of stock or indebtedness" as "void", whereas in its prohibition against
issuance of stock except for "labor done, services performed," it does
not use the word "void", implies that a violation of this latter prohibition Is not to be treated as an utterly void transaction. A more
reasonable interpretation, and one which would better serve the interests of all the parties involved, would be a holding by which the
third person (plaintiff here) would be bound as a stockholder and
made to pay to the corporation the difference, if any, between the par
value of the stock and value of the services performed. This approach has been followed by many courts in cases involving the socalled "trust fund doctrine" or the "fraud or holding-out theory".
See Kelly v. Clark (1898) 21 Mont. 291, 53 P. 959, 69 Am. St. Rep.
668, 42 L. R. A. 621; King v. Pony Gold Mining Co. (1903) 28 Mont.
74, 72 P. 309; John W. Cooney Co. v. Arlington Hotel Co. (1917)
11 Del. Ch. 286, 101 A. 879; Meyer v. Ruby-Trust Mining and Milling
Co. (1905) 192 Mo. 162, 90 S. W. 821; Corrington v. Crosby (1926)
54 N. D. 614, 210 N. W. 342, 48 A. L. R. 660; Mitchell v. Bowles (Tex.
Clv. App., 1923) 248 S. W. 459; Murphy v. Panton (1917) 96 Wash.
637, 165 P. 1074. It is true that in those cases suit was by creditors
of insolvent corporations to force holders of unpaid stock to pay up
to par value, but the question involved was the same-namely, what
effect should be given to an issue of stock for a consideration less
in value than the par value of the stock.
'THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw
(1898), p. 520. MORAN, THE LAw OF EVIDENCE, SOME PROPOSALS FOR

ITS REFORM (1927) pp. 37-49. 10 CAL, Jums., Evidenwe, §329, p. 1097;
JONES ON EVIDENCE, (4th ed. 1938) §323, p. 600.
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since deceased are admissible in evidence, provided the declarant had peculiar means of knowing the matter stated, if he had
no interest to misrepresent it and if the statement was opposed
to his pecuniary or proprietary interest.'
Thus, in a leading English case,' the time of a child's birth
was proved by the production of the ledger of the man-midwife
in which his charge for attendance was marked as paid, there
being also evidence adduced that the work was done. One authority has pointed out: "The courts recognize that it is a fair
presumption that men will neither falsify accounts nor make
false statements if falsehood or mistake is prejudicial to their
own pecuniary interests. This consideration, together with the
facts that the declaration is not admissible during the lifetime of
the author, that any fraudulent motive for making the statement
may be shown, and that such declarations are frequently the
only available mode of proof, are deemed to be of sufficient
force to justify the admission of such declarations, although the
sanction of an oath and the test of cross-examination are wanting. '4

The statement must be against the pecuniary or proprietary
interests of the party making it, at the time he makes it.' If the
party who made the declaration is alive, though out of the jurisdiction so that he cannot be called, the declaration is generally
held to be inadmissible,* though Professor Wigmore and other
'Middleton v. Melton (1829) 10 Barn. & Creswell (Eng.) 317; Short
v. Lee (1820) 2 Jac. & Walk. (Eng.) 489; Matter of Woodward (1902)
68 App. Div. 327, 74 N. Y. S. 18. For cases interpreting statutes see:
Welch v. All Persons (1929) 85 Mont. 144, 278 P. 110; Rulofson v.
Billings (1903) 140 Cal. 452, 74 P. 35; Harp v. Harp (1902) 136
Cal. 421, 69 P. 28; Ross v. Brusie (1883) 64 Cal. 245, 30 P. 811;
Kerner v. Peacock (1933) 129 Cal. App. 686, 19 P. (2d) 283.
'Higham v. Ridgway, (1808) 10 East 109; 2 SMITH's L. C. (12th ed.)
301; see also Smith v. State (1903) 44 Tex. Crim. 606, 73 S. W. 401.
'JONEs ON EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1938) §323, p. 601. See also WIOMORE
ON EVIDENCE (3rd ed..1940) §1455, p. 259 et 8eq. In re Colbert's Estate (1915) 51 Mont. 455, 153 P. 1022; Donelly v. United States
(1913) 228 U. S. 243, 57 L. E. 820, 33 S. Ct. 449; Aldred v. Ray (1915)
54 Okla. 154, 153 P. 664, 7 A. L. R. 1; Carpenter v. Carpenter (1936)
153 Ore. 584, 56 P. (2d) 305, 57 P. (2d) 1098, 58 P. (2d) 507, 105
A. L. R. 386; Halverson v. Moon & K. Lumber Co (1902) 87 Minn. 18,
91 N. W. 28, 94 Am. St. Rep. 669; German Ins. Co. v. Bartlett (1900)
188 Ill. 165, 58 N. E. 1075, 80 Am. St. Rep. 172.
'Sussex 'Peerage Case (1843) 11 Clark & Fenn. 85, 8 Eng. Reprint
1034. See also: People v. Hall (1902) 94 Cal. 595, 30 P. 7; In re
Baird's Estate (1924) 193 Cal. 225, 223 P. 974.
4In re Friedman's Estate (1918) 178 Cal. 27, 172 P. 140; In re Horgan's Estate (1928) 93 Cal. App. 36, 268 P. 1090; Hines v. Comm.
(1923) 136 Va. 728, 117 S. E. 843, 35 A. L. R. 431; Currier v. Gale
(1860) 14 Gray (Mass.) 504, 77 Am. Dec. 343; Hart v. Kendall (1887)
82 Ala. 144, 3 So. 41.
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authorities' who early suggested a more liberal rule, have led
some of the courts to extend the doctrine where convenience and
proper administration of justice permit.' Thus, absence from
the jurisdiction, illness, and insanity have been held sufficient
under the principle of necessity.'
In general, the entire declaration is admissible even though
it includes statements of fact not in themselves against interest,
and when admitted the whole declaration is evidence." The declaration may be written or oral," and oral declarations are admitted apart from the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule."
The declaration is admissible notwithstanding the declarant is
neither a party nor in privity with a party to the action." The
declarations of parties identified in interest with those against
whom they are offered are denominated admissions, and as such
are treated as a different category of the Law of Evidence.1
The admission of one of the parties to a suit is primary evidence as against him, and this is so even where the oral admissions relate to the contents of a written instrument.' An admission has been defined as: "A statement or act which
amounts to the affirmance of some fact material to the issue,
"'The principle of necessity is broad enough to assimilate other causes,
but the rulings upon causes other than death are few. They are
ill-judged, so far as they do not recognize the general principle of
unavailability." WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940), Sta4ement of
Facts Against Interest, §1456, p. 261 citing numerous cases. See also:
JONES ON EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1938) pp. 602-3.
'Weber v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1918) 175 Iowa 358, 151 N. W.
852, L. R. A. 1918A 626; Griffith v. Salus (1890) 77 Tex. 630, 14
S. W. 230.
'South Omaha v. Wrzensinski (1903) 66 Nebr. 790, 92 N. W. 1045;
Syracuse Engineering Co. v. Haight (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) 97 F. (2d)
573 where L. Hand, J., says: "The attempted defence of its introduction is that it was a declaration against . . . interest, but Brown

was alive, and death, or at least inaccessibility, is a condition upon
this exception to the hearsay rule." Mahaska Co. v. Ingalls (1864)
16 Iowa 81.
"Smith v. Moore (1906) 142 N. C. 277, 55 S.E. 275, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.)
684; Doe v. Thynne (1810) 10 East. 206, 103 Eng. Reprint 753, ANNOTrA-

TioN: 11 Eng. Rul. Cas. 276; see infra, also R. C. M. 1935, §10515.
"Lay v. Neville (1864) 25 Cal. 546; Miller v. Wood (1872) 44 Vt. 378.
"Freda v. Tischbein (1913) 174 Mich. 391, 140 N. W. 502, 49 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 700.
"Smith v. Hanson (1908) 34 Utah 171, 96 P. 1087; Turner v. Turner
(1905) 123 Ga. 5, 50 S. E. 969, 107 Am. St. Rep. 76; Tompkins v.
Fonda Glove Co. (1907) 188 N. Y. 261, 80 N. E. 933; JoNEs ON EviDENCE (4th ed. 1938) §323, pp. 600 et seq.
"JONES ON EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1938) §235 et seq. p. 449; WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) vol. 5, §1459, p. 265.
"5Moriarty v. London Ry. (1880) L. R. 5 Q. B. 314; 39 L. J. Q. B. 109;

Behrenfeld v. Breedlove (1915) 27 Cal. App. 419, 150 P. 71; Doyle
v. Doyle (1913) 257 Ill. 229, 100 N. E. 950; Seevers v. Cleveland
Coal Co. (1912) 158 Iowa 574, 138 N. W. 793.
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where such affirmance operates, at the time of trial against the
interest of the party responsible for it." The admissions may be
either direct statements as to the facts in issue, or they may be
statements of other facts or conduct from which the facts in
issue may be so inferred. The admissions of a third party are
admissible when the interest of such person is identified with
that of a party to the suit." Thus, a former owner of land is
considered so identified in interest with a subsequent owner
holding under the same title, that his admissions respecting the
title, made while he is in possession and vested with title, are
receivable in evidence.' The principle on which an admission
against interest is received differs from that of a declaration
against interest. It is never required as a preliminary to using
an opponent's statement that he be dead or otherwise unavailable, and moreover, an opponent's admission is always receivable even though the fact as stated by him was not against his
interest at the time of the statement." An admission is receivable when it is made by a party to a law suit or someone in privity with him."
An important question arises whether the Montana Statutes have retained the common law rules relating to declarations against interest or whether the adoption of the code provisions changed the previously settled doctrines. The recent
case of Wilson v. Davise decided by the Montana Supreme Court
answers this question.
In that case plaintiff sued certain defendants in an action
based on alleged loss of property because of the conspiracy and
wrongful acts of the defendants in witholding from plaintiff
deeds to certain real property and assignments of some personal
property executed by deceased in her lifetime in favor of plaintiff and delivered by deceased to one of the defendants. To
prove the execution and delivery of the deeds and of the assignments of the stocks and bonds, plaintiff testified to statements
alleged to have been made to her and to others by the declarant
in her lifetime. Plaintiff produced witnesses who testified that
the declarant had said that she intended to provide for the
plaintiff and her husband and had left them certain property.
"'McKELvEY, EVIDENCE) (4th ed. 1932) §72, p. 123.
"Sybray v. White (1809) 1 Mees. & W. 425.
"Freeman v. Brewster (1894) 93 Ga. 648, 21 S. E. 165.
"oCaswell v. Maplewood Garage (1930) 84 N. H. 241, 149 A. 746; JoNEs
ON EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1938) §236, p. 452.
"Boston Ry. Co. v. O'Reilly (1895) 158 U. S. 334, 39 L. Ed. 1006, 15
S. Ct. 830; Riley v. Martinelli (1893) 7 Cal. 575, 32 P. 579; 32 P.
579; Manning v. Foster (1908) 49 Wash. 541, 96 P. 233.
"R. C. M. 1935, §10506 et seq. £ nfru.
nWilson v. Davis (1940) 110 Mont. 356, 103 P. (2d) 149.
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All of the declarations insofar as they related to the gift of
property to the plaintiff were allegedly made subsequent to the
alleged execution of the deed and assignments in question. The
majority of the court held such declarations were incompetent
to establish the actual transfers, saying that the declarant's
statements were inadmissable under Montana statutory provisions both because they were not against her interest when made
and because the defendants were not the declarant's successors in
interest.*
The court based its reasoning on certain sections of the
REVISED CODES OF MONTANA 1935, namely, Sections 10506 to
10515 inclusive.' The court quoted Section 10509 which provides: "The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by the declaration, act, or omission of another, except by virtue of a particular relation between them; therefore proceedings against
one cannot affect another." The court said that all of these
statutes taken together provided but three exceptions to the
1. Declarations of predecessor in
hearsay rule, as follows:
title; 2. Declarations of decedent against his pecuniary interest; 3. Res Gestae.
The majority's conclusion was that under these sections a
declaration in respect to an interest in real property was only
admissible if the party attempting to introduce the declaration
was a successor in interest of the declarant. The court said further, that even if the parties were in privity the declaration
was inadmissible where the declarant had parted with title to
"The court argues that accepting the plaintiff's theory of the case,

the declaration would be inadmissible since the declarant had parted
with title before she made the statements.
"These statutes are as follows: §10506 "A witness can testify to those
facts only which he knows - of his own knowledge; that is, which
are derived from his own perceptions, except in those few express
cases in which his opinions inferences, or the declarations of others
are admissible." §10507 "A witness can be heard only upon oath. .. ."
§10508 "A witness is presumed to speak the truth.... ." §10509 "The
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by the declaration, act, or
omission of another, except by virtue of a particular relation between
them.. . ." §10510 "Where, however, one derives title to real property
from another, the declaration, act or omission of the latter, while
holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the
former." §10511 "Where also, the declaration, act or omission forms
part of a transaction, which is itself the fact in dispute, or evidence
of that fact, such declaration, act, or omission is evidence, as part
of the transaction." §10514 "The declaration, act, or omission of a
decedent, having sufficient knowledge of the subject, against his
pecuniary interest, is also admissible as evidence to that extent against
his successor in interest." §10515. "When part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the
whole on the same subject may be inquired into by the other. .... "
(Sections 10512 and 10513 are not in point here.) §10531 (subdivision
4) Is quoted supra.
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the property, but was still in possession, on the ground that the
declarant had no interest even though the purpose of introducing the declaration was to show that the declarant had in fact
parted with title. As far as the personal property was concerned, the court held that since the declaration concerning the
real property was inadmissible, there was no need to discuss
the statements alleged to have been made concerning the personalty. There was a strong dissent in the case on all these propositions, Mr. Justice Erickson holding that the declarations were
admissible since the sections of the Montana Code on this subject were not intended to abridge the distinction between declarations and admissions.=
The case then, squarely held that the common law rule relative to declarations against interest was not the law in Montana. There is serious doubt whether such a construction of the
statutes is advisable or necessary, at least in regard to declarations about real property. It is highly probable that the Montana statutes weie intended to retain the common law rules.'
The California Court in its interpretation of the same code provisions has not so limited its statutes, but has adhered to the
common law doctrine, and has held on facts identical with those
in the Wilson case that the declaration is admissible."
M

"110 Mont. 371, 103 P. (2d) 157.
R. C. M. 1935, §10703 provides: "In this state there is no common
law in any case where the law is declared by the code or the statute;
but where not so declared, if the same is applicable and of a general
nature, and not in conflict with the code or other statutes, the common law shall be the law and rule of decision." Even in view of
this statute it would seem that the common law rules are applicable,
since they are not in conflict with the statutes.
"The Montana statutes are similar to the California code sections,
(1856 through 1870, C. C. P.). The statutes were not taken from
the N. Y. Field Code. In general, the California court has made no
effort to decide the cases strictly according to the statutes, and in
many cases the court has failed to distinguish between admissions
and declarations against interest. Bell v. Staacke (1911) 159 Cal.
193, 115 P. 221; Keith v. Electrical Engineering Co. (1902) 136 Cal.
178, 68 P. 598; Bias v. Reed (1914) 169 Cal. 33, 145 P. 516; Lauricella v. Lauricella, (1911) 161 Cal. 62;, 118 P. 430; Williams v.
Harter (1898) 121 Cal. 47, 53 P. 405; 10 CAL. JuPIs , EVIDENCE 306,
312, and 319, pp. 1055-1100. In James v. James (1926) 80 Cal. App.
185, 251 P. 666, the California Court said: "The next objection which
seems necessary to consider is that in relation to excluding testimony
as to statements made by the grantor of the plaintiff just before
and after the execution and delivery of the conveyance by him to her.
It is well-settled that all such statements which would indicate that
the grantor named in the instrument had divested himself of title
are admissible as against interest ....
" citing Williams v. Kidd (1915)
170 Cal. 631, 151 P. 1, ANN. CAB. 1916E, 703. In this case the court
pointed out: "It is, of course, well-settled that acts and declarations
of a grantor made after he has parted with title to property and in
disparagement of it are inadmissible when made in the absence of the
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In the Montana case of Laundreville v. Merou the Court
held contra to the later Wilson case. There, defendant's theory,
as in the Wilson case, was that the declarant was the owner of
the property in question; the plaintiff's that the declarant had
deeded it to him. The court said: "Contention is also made
that the evidence given by Conley to the effect that decedent,
after the making of the deeds told him that he had deeded all
his land away, and that the forty acres in question belonged to
Laundreville, was inadmissible as hearsay. This evidence was
admissible by reason of subdivision 4, section 10531, Revised
Codes 1921, which makes admissible 'the act or declaration of a
deceased person done or made against his interest in respect to
his real property'.' '
This decision is important because it allows the declaration
to be admitted even though the declaration was made after the
decedent had allegedly parted with title to his real property.
The Montana Court in the Wilson case was unwilling to allow
such a declaration to be admitted. However, such a declaration
is clearly against the proprietary interest of the declarant when
the declarption is made, even though the declarant merely has
possession and not title when he makes the declaration,' and in
Montana, under Section 10531, subdivision 4, a declaration of a
deceased person concerning his real property should be admissible regardless of whether the declarant at tle time of making
the statement had title or not, and regardless of whether the
party against whom the statement is admitted was in privity
with the declarant, or whether the declarant was a party to the
action or in privity with. one of the parties. This interpretation
of the Montana statute is in harmony with the common law decisions and has been enunciated by the California Court in congrantee. But here the very question was whether Williams had ever
parted with title to the property. This was the main issue in the
case; the claim of respondents being that there had been no delivery
of the deed. .

.

.

Such declarations were properly admissible as

bearing on the question of whether there had been a delivery of the
deed." Thus we see that the California Court has limited the rule
neither on the basis of privity nor on the basis of title in interpreting
the same statute.
bLaundreville v. Mera (1929) 86 Mont. 43, 281 P. 749, 69 A. L. R. 416.
"See also Osnes Livestock Co. v. Wa'ren (1936) 103 Mont. 284, 62 P.
(2d) 206; Washoe Copper Co. v. Junila (1911) 43 Mont. 178, 115
P. 917. Both of these cases are distinguishable as the dissenting
opinion in the Wilson case points out. Wilson v. Davis (1940) 110
Mont. 373, 103 P. (2d) 149.
"Laundreville v. Mero (1929) 86 Mont. 43, 281 P. 749, 69 A. L. R.
416. Scott v. Crouch (1902) 24 Utah 377, 67 P. 1068. The court in
the Wilgson case failed to overrule this Laundreville case. Also see
note 31, infr'.
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struing the same statutes." It is therefore submitted that the
Montana Court in the Wilson case erred, at least with regard
to the declaration in respect to the real property, when it said
that the declaration was not admissible because it was not
against interest and because defendants were not in privity with
the declarant.
There is a question, however, whether under the Montana
statutes a declaration against a party's interest in regard to his
personal property may be admitted. The statute referred to,
Section 10531 (4), refers only to real property. In the Wilson
case, where there was both realty and personalty, Mr. Justice
Erickson suggested that the declarations concerning the personal property could be received in evidence as part of the declaration concerning real property. This would seem to be a correct analysis, because the guarantees of truthfulness sufficient
to accept the declaration about real property would hold good
for the personal property." Since there is no specific Montana
statutory enactment on declarations relating to personal property, we may inquire whether the intent of the legislature was to
exclude such declarations, although that would violate the common law rule.' An analogy is the parol evidence rule stated in
Section 10517, which gives the Montana statutory rule for the
reception of oral evidence, but which has been interpreted to
be merely declaratory of the common law rule." It is submitted
that this approach should be adopted concerning deelarations
"As pointed out in note 27, supra, the California Court on similar facts
has interpreted the statutes in the light of the common law rules.
"When the issue is whether a party had divested himself of title,
his declarations and acts after the signing of the instrument, in form
a deed to the property in dispute, and tending to show a delivery
thereof are admissible as declarations against Interest." Rice v. Carey
(1915) 170 Cal. 748, 151 P. 135; Donahue v. Sweeney (1915) 171 Cal.
388, 153 P. 708. The excellent annotation on this subject In ANN.
CAS. 1916E, p. 713 cites this rule with approval saying: "In some
cases, evidence of declarations by a grantor after the conveyance as
to the delivery of the deed has been admitted without any question
being raised as to its admissibility", citing cases. And, further, "In
these cases, the fact that the declaration is made while the declarant
is still in possession of the property makes the declaration be against
his proprietary interest, and thus satisfies the interest requirement."
"of. note 10, supra
'cf. note 26, supra. R. C. M. 1935, §17 does not repeal any law or
rule except in cases provided for by the code. The Wilson case holds
such declarations inadmissible relying generally on R. C. M. 1935,
§10509.
24§10517
provides: "When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing by the parties, It Is to be considered as containing
all those terms...." That this section is merely declaratory of the
common law is held in: Gaffney Mercantile Co. v. Hopkins (1898) 21
Mont. 13, 52 P. 561; Riddell v. Peck-Williamson (1902) 27 Mont. 44,
69 P. 241.
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against interest regarding personal property, and that even
where the declaration relates solely to personal property, the
better view would be to allow the declaration to be admitted.
Professor Wigmore in speaking of the general statutory
enactments dealing with statements against interest has remarked: "They are for the most part obstructive or confusing
rather than helpful; for they either restate merely, in a form too
concise to be useful, the established common law rule, or they
mingle in inextricable confusion certain fragments of this and
other exceptions."' This criticism is surely trenchant for Montana. Section 10510 concerning declarations of a predecessor in
title clearly refers to an admission. Section 10514 making admissible declarations of decedents against their pecuniary interest, is in harmony with common law rules, but this particular statute is made incomprehensible by the addition of the
words "against his successor in interest" which makes it possible to construe the statute as providing that declarations
against interest are admissible only against successors or privies, which clearly was not the common law rule. Section 10531
(4), permitting the admission of declarations against interest,
in terms applies only to real property, and if construed as so
limiting the law it engrafts another condition in Montana which
was not contemplated by the common law. These three statutes,
either because of poor original draftsmanship or failure by the
framers to understand the common law, have resulted in confusion.
A decision like that in the Wilson case, which clearly confused declarations against interest with admissions, does not
come as a surprise under such statutes. However, it is the opinion of the author of this comment that the declaration sought to
be introduced in the Wilson case was clearly against the declarant's interest when made and so should have been admitted even
though the parties were not in privity. Further, it is suggested
that the Montana Court in the future should receive declarations against interest in regard to personal property as well as
realty, and recognize the clear cut, common law distinction between admissions and declarations against interest.
-Walter Paul Coombs.
25 WIGMORE

ON EVIDENCn (3rd ed., 1940) §1455, p. 260.
Re Wilfred
B. Keenan (1934) 287 Mass. 577, 192 N. E. 65, gives a detailed discussion of the Massachusetts statutes, while 96 A. L. R. 679 contains
an excellent annotation on the statutory enactments of several other
states.
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